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I. INTRODUCTION
When Congress passed and President George Bush signed the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990,1 millions of Americans with
disabilities celebrated what appeared to be a monumental change in the
protection of their civil rights.2  But challenges to the law quickly arose
that required U.S. courts, and finally, the U.S. Supreme Court, to provide
essential interpretations of the terms of this landmark legislation.  Sup-
porters of the 1990 law believed that the early controversial decisions by
the U.S. Supreme Court severely constricted the broad protections Con-
gress intended to provide to individuals with disabilities through the
ADA.3  Discontentment with these judicial interpretations led to an ef-
fort by members of Congress to pass the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990).  The Americans with Disabilities Act’s stated purpose is as follows:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimina-
tion against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the stan-
dards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities;
(4) and to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to en-
force the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address
the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
Id. § 2(b), 104 Stat. at 329.
2. In 1990, President George H.W. Bush signed the ADA, stating that “[w]ith today’s
signing of the landmark Americans with Disabilities Act, every man, woman, and child
with a disability can now pass through once-closed doors into a bright new era of equality,
independence, and freedom.”  154 CONG. REC. H.6066 (daily ed. June 25, 2008) (statement
of Rep. Hoyer (D-Md.) quoting President George H.W. Bush on the floor of the House
during debate over the ADA Amendments Act of 2008).
3. See Jeannette Cox, Crossroads and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
85 IND. L. J. 187, 198-99 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court constricted the ADA
through its decisions, and overlooked Congress’s original intentions).
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(ADAAA).4  These amendments passed with substantial bipartisan sup-
port and were signed into law by President George W. Bush.5
In his vigorous dissenting opinion in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,6
Justice John Paul Stevens gave voice to members of the disability commu-
nity’s widespread dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court’s restricted ap-
proach to the statute.7  Justice Stevens argued that the Court’s restrictive
interpretation of the term “substantially limits” was in direct contradic-
tion to the law’s fundamental purpose of ending discrimination against
people with disabilities.8  The mounting criticism of the Supreme Court’s
interpretative straightjacket now had a specific theoretical framework.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the contrasting textual
interpretations offered by the Court related to the definition of “disabil-
ity” in the original ADA.  Next, it reviews the purposes and findings of
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 that examine the conflict that arose
over the correct original interpretation of the ADA.  Third, this Article
provides critical analysis of the Supreme Court’s problematic interpreta-
tions including: (1) its interpretation of Congress’s ambiguous language in
the text of the original; (2) the Court’s disdain for the legislative history
of the ADA including congressional reports and selective use of these
instruments when deciding issues of statutory construction; and (3) the
Court’s potential error in judgment of relying on federal agency guide-
lines for interpretations of the language of the original ADA when no
agency had been granted interpretative authority over the ADA.
4. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 2(a)(4)–(a)(7),
122 Stat. 3553, 3553.
5. President George W. Bush signed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 on Septem-
ber 25, 2008.  Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Signs S. 3406
into Law (Sept. 25, 2008) (available at 2008 WL 4359444). The President and the CEO of
the American Association of People with Disabilities, Andrew Imparato, remarked on the
signing of the Act:
Today President Bush has followed in his father’s footsteps and taken a stand for
equal opportunity and full participation for all Americans.  I deeply appreciate the
bipartisan leadership in the Congress that brought us to this point, and I thank Presi-
dent Bush for his leadership in signing this critical civil rights law that will make a real
difference in the lives of millions of Americans with disabilities and chronic health
conditions . . . .
AAPD Applauds President Bush for Signing ADA Amendments Act into Law, PRNEW-
SWIRE, Sept. 25, 2008, available at http://www.disabilityrightsmt.org/janda/articles/Upload
File/1222370802_AAPD%20Applaudes%20President.pdf.
6. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
7. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 495 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 502–03.  Justice Stevens opined that “[t]he Act generally protects individuals
who have ‘correctable’ substantially limiting impairments from unjustified employment
discrimination on the basis of those impairments.” Id.
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Part IV then considers what legal developments have occurred since
the passage of the ADAAA and what this means for the interpretation of
“disability.”  Finally, this Article concludes with a brief commentary on
the relationship between the Supreme Court and Congress, how the dy-
namic between the branches can both hinder and advance public policy,
and how a new interpretation of disability could impact disability law,
particularly in looking at obesity as a disability.
II. THE ORIGINAL ADA “DISABILITY”
Due to its lack of precision the term “disability,” as defined by Con-
gress in the original ADA, arguably left open room for interpretation by
the courts.  The ADA originally defined disability in the following
manner:
The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual—
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.9
In Bragdon v. Abbott,10 the Supreme Court recognized this definition
of “disability” as having originated “almost verbatim from the definition
of ‘handicapped individual’” in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 “and the definition of ‘handicap’ contained in the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988 . . . . ”11  The assumption could be made from
this analysis that the Supreme Court would interpret the language in the
ADA parallel to that of the Rehabilitation Act.  The Court conceivably
could have been establishing an interpretative pattern for its jurispru-
dence in the area of civil rights discrimination based on disability in fed-
eral law.  Eventually, to the dismay of many members of Congress,
disability advocates, and individuals with disabilities, the Supreme Court
would go on to prove that was not the case as the Court’s involvement in
the ADA’s interpretation increased.
A. Supreme Strictness of “Substantially Limits”
In writing the ADA, Congress was silent on defining the term “substan-
tially limits.”  The significance of the meaning of “substantially limits” is
that an individual’s ability to qualify as disabled under the ADA is depen-
dent on the interpretation of this term included within the definition of
9. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 3(2), 104
Stat. 327, 329–30.
10. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
11. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998).
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“disability.”12  In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Wil-
liams,13 the Court provided a specific interpretation of “substantially lim-
its.”14  The Court stated, “to be substantially limited in performing
manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or
severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central
importance to most people’s daily lives.”15  The Court in Toyota also
made a distinction in this definition involving the relationship between
the impairment and the degree of interference it causes in performing a
major life activity.16  “The word ‘substantial’ thus clearly precludes im-
pairments that interfere in only a minor way with the performance of
manual tasks from qualifying as disabilities.”17  This interpretation of
“substantially limits” in Toyota was constructed largely on the basis of
affirming the Court’s precedent on the impact of impairment on work-
ing.18  The Toyota Court determined that an individual would need to be
substantially limited in another daily life activity besides working to qual-
ify as having a disability under the ADA.19  The Court articulated this
strict standard as follows:
When addressing the major life activity of performing manual tasks,
the central inquiry must be whether the claimant is unable to per-
form the variety of tasks central to most people’s daily lives, not
whether the claimant is unable to perform the tasks associated with
her specific job.  Otherwise, Sutton’s restriction on claims of disabil-
ity based on a substantial limitation in working will be rendered
meaningless because an inability to perform a specific job always can
be recast as an inability to perform a “class” of tasks associated with
that specific job.20
There is no textual evidence in the ADA to support this view in light of
congressional silence.  Contrary to this interpretation, the ADA also
could have been read to qualify an individual as having a disability be-
cause of an impairment that substantially limits the individual’s ability to
work as a major life activity.
The path the Court took to arrive at this definition and fill the congres-
sional silence relied heavily on agency guidelines.  In reaching this defini-
12. ADA § 3(2)(A).
13. 534 U.S. 184 (2002)
14. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196–97 (2002).
15. Id. at 198.
16. Id. at 196–97.
17. Id. at 197.
18. Id. at 199–200.
19. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 200–01.
20. Id.
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tion of “substantially limits” in Toyota, the Court identified two sources
of guidance for interpretation: (1) the regulations interpreting the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973; and (2) EEOC regulations for interpretation of the
ADA.21  The Court also acknowledged Congress’s use of language in the
ADA, which is identical to that of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, sug-
gesting construction “in accordance with the pre-existing regulatory inter-
pretations” of the Rehabilitation Act.22  The existence of the EEOC
regulations that define “disability” were referred to as persuasive author-
ity by the Court despite the lack of interpretative authority given to any
agency over the ADA.23  The Court here noted that although both parties
found the regulations of the EEOC “reasonable,” there was no way to
determine how much deference these definitions should be given.24  This
response by the Court seems valid as compared to the Court’s discussion
of the regulations for the Rehabilitation Act.  Regulations for the Reha-
bilitation Act were issued in 1977 by the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare (HEW).25  HEW was given enforcement and
implementation authority of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.26  At that
time, HEW never defined “substantially limits” while the Court went on
to cite the EEOC definition of “substantially limited” despite its limited
“persuasive” authority.27  As the Court then proceeded to fill in the
empty gaps of terms within the definition of “disability,” it looked to
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary and the Oxford English
Dictionary for its definitions of “substantially limits” in conjunction with
the EEOC regulation’s definition of the word.28
21. Id. at 193.
22. Id. at 194.
23. Id.
24. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194 (2002).
25. Justice O’Conner in delivering the decision of the Court wrote:
The Rehabilitation Act regulations issued by the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) in 1977, which appear without change in the current regulations
issued by the Department of Health and Human Services, define “physical impair-
ment,” the type of impairment relevant to this case, to mean “any physiological disor-
der or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of
the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; re-
spiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-uri-
nary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine.
Id. at 194 (citing 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (2001)).
26. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 3, 87 Stat. 355, 357–58; Toyota
Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 195.
27. See Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 193–94 (interpreting “Congress’[s] repetition
of a well-established term” as congressional intention of construction “in accordance with
pre-existing regulatory interpretations” as contrasted with the “less clear” “persuasive au-
thority of the EEOC regulations”).
28. Id. at 196–97.
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Another critical point in reviewing the Court’s analysis is the heavy
weight that was given to agency regulations over the minimal considera-
tion of the ADA’s legislative intent.  The only reference the Court made
to the legislative intent for the ADA was shown by a statistic representing
the number of people Congress listed as having disabilities.29  The
Court’s evaluation of that number, as its sole reflection on the legislative
intent, combined with the EEOC regulation was the basis for creating a
stringent standard for “substantially limits” under the ADA:
That these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a demand-
ing standard for qualifying as disabled is confirmed by the first sec-
tion of the ADA, which lays out the legislative findings and purposes
that motivate the Act.  When it enacted the ADA in 1990, Congress
found that “some [forty-three million] Americans have one or more
physical or mental disabilities.”  If Congress intended everyone with
a physical impairment that precluded the performance of some iso-
lated, unimportant, or particularly difficult manual task to qualify as
disabled, the number of disabled Americans would surely have been
much higher.30
The Court’s restrictive interpretation of “substantially limits” demon-
strates several potential problems in its statutory construction.  First, the
Court may very well have gone outside Congress’s view of “substantially
limits” by finding working, in and of itself, to be insufficient for its mean-
ing.  The Court then continued to draw a strict line on the definition from
that premise.  Second, the Court’s reliance on agency regulations for in-
terpreting the ADA when no agency has been given authority for its in-
terpretation is questionable.31  Finally, the Court’s disregard for the
legislative intent through its intense scrutiny of a single aspect of that
intent begs the question whether the Court should be probing into such
deep inquiry rather than taking the intent at face value.
B. Filling in the Gaps for “Major Life Activities”
Another area where congressional silence left room for interpretation
in the definition of “disability” was lack of guidance for what constitutes
“major life activities.”  Again, the Court in Toyota was called upon to
replace this silence with meaning.32  As the Court had previously done
29. Id. at 197.
30. Id. (internal citations omitted).
31. See id. at 194 (“Because both parties accept the EEOC regulations as reasonable,
we assume without deciding that they are, and we have no occasion to decide what level of
deference, if any, they are due.”).
32. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 197 (defining “major” in order to interpret “major
life activities” under the ADA).
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with the term “substantially limits,” it referred to the Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary to provide an initial understanding for “ma-
jor.”33  The Court used this reference in order to define “major” as im-
portant.34  From this meaning, the Court proceeded to define “major life
activities” in the following manner, “‘Major life activities’ thus refers to
those activities that are of central importance to daily life.”35
C. The Use of “Mitigating Measures” to Disqualify Disability
The analysis used by the Court to decide whether or not an individual
has a disability included a consideration of whether or not the individual
could use assistive technology or accommodations to lessen the impact of
the individual’s disability.36  In Sutton, the Court made a blatant state-
ment of its unwillingness to even consider legislative history in determin-
ing whether or not corrective or mitigating measures should be taken into
account to determine whether or not a person qualifies as having a
disability:
We conclude that respondent is correct that the approach adopted by
the agency guidelines—that persons are to be evaluated in their hy-
pothetical uncorrected state—is an impermissible interpretation of
the ADA.  Looking at the Act as a whole, it is apparent that if a
person is taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or
mental impairment, the effects of those measures—both positive and
negative—must be taken into account when judging whether that
person is “substantially limited” in a major life activity and thus “dis-
abled” under the Act.  Justice Stevens relies on the legislative history
of the ADA for the contrary proposition that individuals should be
examined in their uncorrected state.  Because we decide that, by its
terms, the ADA cannot be read in this manner, we have no reason to
consider the ADA’s legislative history.37
Clearly this highlights the disagreement within the Court itself of the
role and impact that Congress’s purposes for enactment of the ADA
should have on its interpretation.  The Court continued its analysis by
explaining its approach to the inclusion of “corrective measures” in the
determination of disability.38  The Court’s understanding of “corrective
measures” comes from looking at several words together in context: “dis-
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
37. Id. (internal citations omitted).
38. Id. at 481.
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ability,” “substantially limits,” and “major life activities.”39  The Court
described this analysis as follows:
Because the phrase “substantially limits” appears in the Act in the
present indicative verb form, we think the language is properly read
as requiring that a person be presently—not potentially or hypotheti-
cally—substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability.  A
“disability” exists only where an impairment “substantially limits” a
major life activity, not where it “might,” “could,” or “would” be sub-
stantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken.  A person
whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication or
other measures does not have an impairment that presently “sub-
stantially limits” a major life activity.  To be sure, a person whose
physical or mental impairment is corrected by mitigating measures
still has an impairment, but if the impairment is corrected it does not
“substantially limi[t]” a major life activity.40
The Court engaged in what appears to be an interesting word play to
lead it to the conclusion that someone utilizing “corrective measures” re-
ally has no disability at all.  The view the Court adopted is that because
such corrections are available, the person with a disability who uses these
measures loses his or her categorization as disabled under the ADA.41
This is problematic as the Court creates a misleading, and in many cases
false impression, that the disability magically vanishes or is eliminated.
The Court instead views a disability in these circumstances as being “po-
tential” or “hypothetical” when the reality is that with or without the
availability of the correction, the individual would still live with a
disability.
The Court’s analysis then continued by examining the definition of dis-
ability and the recognition that this evaluation always requires an “indi-
vidualized inquiry.”42  The Court claimed that in order for the notion of
“individualized inquiry” to operate appropriately, the guidelines that
have been created as an attempt to provide interpretation of the ADA’s
language cannot be correct.43  The Court articulated this view below:
The agency guidelines’ directive that persons be judged in their un-
corrected or unmitigated state runs directly counter to the individu-
alized inquiry mandated by the ADA.  The agency approach would
often require courts and employers to speculate about a person’s
39. Id. at 482-83.
40. Id.
41. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483, 486 (reasoning that the use of such corrective mea-
sures renders the impairment “corrected,” and thus is no longer substantially limiting).
42. Id. at 483.
43. Id.
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condition and would, in many cases, force them to make a disability
determination based on general information about how an uncor-
rected impairment usually affects individuals, rather than on the in-
dividual’s actual condition.44
This leads to the conclusion that the use of the guidelines would result
in evaluating based on a group with similar disabilities rather than an
individual inquiry of disability.45  According to the Supreme Court,
“[t]his is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the ADA.”46
Like in the Toyota case, the Court also focused on the number of indi-
viduals with disabilities identified by Congress in the “findings” section of
the original ADA.47  The Court suggested that the approach of pinpoint-
ing the number at “[forty-three] million” provided insight as to whether
or not individuals with disabilities using “corrective measures” were to be
included in the framework of ADA’s protections.48  The Court stated:
Regardless of its exact source, however, the [forty-three] million fig-
ure reflects an understanding that those whose impairments are
largely corrected by medication or other devices are not “disabled”
within the meaning of the ADA.  The estimate is consistent with the
numbers produced by studies performed during this same time pe-
riod that took a similar functional approach to determining
disability.49
Furthermore, the Court rationalized that if in fact Congress intended to
be inclusive of those using mitigating measures as qualified individuals
with disabilities, they would have accounted for this in the number
estimate:
Because it is included in the ADA’s text, the finding that [forty-
three] million individuals are disabled gives content to the ADA’s
terms, specifically the term “disability.”  Had Congress intended to
include all persons with corrected physical limitations among those
covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher
number of disabled persons in the findings.  That it did not is evi-
44. Id.
45. See id. at 483–84 (noting the Court’s dissatisfaction with the guidelines approach
to determining whether an individual is disabled or not).
46. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484 (1999).
47. See id. (noting the Congressional findings indicate lack of congressional intent for
ADA coverage for those whose uncorrected conditions resulted in disabilities); see also
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) (confirming the impor-
tance of using strict interpretation to form a standard for qualifying as disabled as reflected
in the legislative findings and purposes behind the act).
48. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 486.
49. Id.
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dence that the ADA’s coverage is restricted to only those whose im-
pairments are not mitigated by corrective measures.50
III. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE OF THE ADA AMENDMENTS
ACT OF 2008
Under the “Findings and Purposes” sections of the ADA Amendments
Act of 2008, Congress reiterated its intent for originally enacting the
ADA to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities” and to
“provide broad coverage.”51  The “Findings” section emphasized that the
passage of the ADA was meant to ensure the protection of the human
dignity of individuals with disabilities regardless of the nature of the
mental or physical limitations recognizing that a disability “in no way di-
minishes a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society.”52
Congress stressed that the necessity for the inclusion of people with disa-
bilities in this way requires the elimination of remaining “societal and
institutional barriers” as well as “prejudice” and “antiquated attitudes.”53
Congress then admitted that it made the assumption that courts would
interpret “disability” under the ADA identically to the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.54  Furthermore, this acknowledgment was accompanied by
the reality of the situation—left to the discretion of the courts, the defini-
tion of “disability” has been interpreted contrary to congressional in-
tent.55  Congress cited problematic U.S. Supreme Court precedent that
has largely contributed to the misinterpretation of the definition of “disa-
bility” under the ADA in courts across the nation.56  Specifically, Con-
gress pointed to the interpretation of the term “substantially limits” by
the Court in Toyota as well as the EEOC’s guidelines that have created a
much more stringent standard than was intended.57
Interestingly, the outlined purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of
2008 established a formal rejection of previous Court precedent based on
50. Id. at 487.
51. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(1), 122
Stat. 3553, 3553.
52. Id. § 2(a)(2).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 2(a)(3).
55. Id. (finding that “Congress expected that the definition of disability under the
ADA would be interpreted consistently with how courts had applied the definition of a
handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that expectation has not
been fulfilled”).
56. ADAA § 2(a)(4)–(5), (7).
57. Id. § 2(a)(7).
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statutory construction and interpretation.58  Congress specifically rejected
the Court’s statutory construction in Sutton that permits lower courts to
consider “ameliorative effects of mitigating circumstances” in order to
make a determination of whether or not an individual qualifies as having
a disability.59  Additionally, Congress expressed its rejection of the
Court’s interpretation of disability coverage in Sutton, instead noting its
preference for the Court’s analysis in School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline60 in evaluating disabilities under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.61  In Toyota, the Court’s strict interpretation of “substantial” and
“major” in defining “disability” significantly narrowed the ADA’s protec-
tions of who qualifies as disabled.62  Congress rejected this interpreta-
tion.63  Congress also rejected the Court’s extensive analysis in Toyota as
to whether an individual qualifies, because instead Congress intended to
place the focus of analysis in ADA cases on “whether entities covered
under the ADA have complied with their obligations.”64
These opening sections of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 show
that either the Court placed minimal value on the legislative intent for
the ADA or that the Court properly interpreted the ADA as drafted be-
cause of congressional error that left interpretation open to the courts.  In
order to examine these competing views of why the ADA Amendments
Act of 2008 potentially evolved, it is necessary to consider the response to
Court precedent and the changes reflected in the amendments in relation
to the original ADA’s legislative history.
A. Responding to the Supreme Court: Changes Through the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008
Among the most significant changes to the original ADA through the
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) was to provide clarification
58. Id. § 2(b).
59. Id. § 2(b)(2).
60. 480 U.S. 273 (1987)
61. ADAAA §2(b)(3); see Gary Lawson, AIDS, Astrology, and Arline: Towards A
Causal Interpretation of Section 504, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 237, 237 (1989) (“In School
Board v. Arline, the Supreme Court held that a school teacher with a history of infectious
tuberculosis was an ‘individual with handicaps protected by [S]ection 504, and that the
determination of whether she was ‘otherwise qualified’ to teach elementary school re-
quired a sound medical assessment of the risks of contagion posed by her condition.”)
(internal citations omitted).
62. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197-98 (2002) (restrict-
ing “major life activities” to those activities which are central to daily living, and holding
that for someone to be “substantially limited,” the impairment must “prevent[ ] or severely
restrict[ ]” them from performing those “major life activities”).
63. ADAAA § 2(b)(4).
64. Id. § 2(b)(5).
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to the definition of “disability.”65  As Congress articulated, “disability”
was not to be narrowly defined and instead a “definition . . . shall be
construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this Act, to the
maximum extent permitted by the terms of the Act.”66
1. Reconstructing the Test for “Substantially Limits”
In response to its disagreement with the Court’s reasoning for creating
such a strict line of interpretation of “substantially limits” in Toyota, Con-
gress provided instruction in the amendments for statutory construction
of this term.  The amendments emphasize that the construction of sub-
stantially limits “shall be interpreted consistently with the findings and
purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.”67  The amendments
explicitly state the extent to which an impairment “substantially limits”
one major life activity will be sufficient to qualify the individual as dis-
abled, “[a]n impairment that “substantially limits one major life activity
need not limit other major life activities in order to be considered a
disability.”68
It would seem if in fact the Court had interpreted the purpose of the
ADA as Congress had intended, Congress would feel no need to come in
and proscribe specific rules of construction to these terms.  The only
weight given by the Court to legislative intent or history provides a very
technical and limited understanding of congressional intent by suggesting
that the numbers provided in the ADA do not add up in terms of the
number of people with disabilities Congress may actually have intended
to protect.  For the Court, it was as if Congress was to foresee every single
person it could and would consider as a person who qualified as having a
disability and received protection under the ADA.69  The Court erred on
the side of exclusion rather than inclusion that at first blush appears con-
trary to the very goal of the enactment of civil rights legislation.  Further-
more, the Court never dug any deeper into the purposes that Congress
specified for the creation and implementation of the ADA.  There were
no efforts by the Court to point to any of the congressional reports that
would provide key insight into legislative history to demonstrate the ne-
cessity of enacting the ADA.  It appears illogical and unpersuasive in con-
65. Id. Sec. 4, § 3(1), 122 Stat. at 3555.
66. Id. Sec. 4, § 3(4) (entitled “Rules of Construction Regarding the Definition of
Disability”).
67. Id. Sec. 4, § 3(4)(B).
68. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-325, Sec. 4,
§ 3(4)(C), 122 Stat. 3553, 3556.
69. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (“That the
Act defines ‘disability’ ‘with respect to an individual’ . . . makes clear that Congress in-
tended the existence of a disability to be determined in such a case-by-case manner.”)
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sideration of the ADA’s significance as civil rights legislation that the
Court’s examination of legislative intent and history was slim if not bare
bones.
2. Defining “Major Life Activities”
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 replaces previous congressional
silence with a detailed definition of “major life activities” that outline
specific activities deemed applicable in order to satisfy the definition of
“disability.”  These activities “include, but are not limited to, caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walk-
ing, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, con-
centrating, thinking, communicating, and working,” as well as “the
operation of a major bodily function, including . . . functions of the im-
mune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological,
brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”70
There is no indication by the Court of its use of legislative intent or
history in its analysis of “major life activities” in Toyota.  The Court ex-
amined that term combined with defining “substantially limits.”71  In de-
fining “substantially limits,” the Court only considered legislative history
and congressional intent to the extent of Congress’s ability to do a num-
ber crunch of how many people it identified as having disabilities.72
While it can be argued that Congress may have taken greater care to
draft more specific definitions of these key terms within the definition of
“disability,” the Court failed to take account of legislative history of the
ADA or congressional intent in any substantial degree in the absence of
precise definitions of language that is critical to the law’s protections.
The list provided by Congress for “major life activities” under the
ADAAA does not seem beyond basic logic or common sense to the aver-
age person that Congress should be required to spell the activities out in
the law.  The activities are items that a person engages in on a daily basis.
If Congress is subjected to having to define every single term in its legisla-
tion for fear that the Court may misinterpret its meaning, Congress may
also err by creating laws that are too narrow and do not account for fu-
ture circumstances.  There may have been cases unknown to Congress of
individuals equally deserving of the ADA’s protections that were at the
time of drafting the ADA unknown, but that Congress suspected would
later arise i.e. the emergence of new disabilities or conditions.  Finally, it
could be argued that if Congress does tailor its language with such preci-
sion it will usurp the power of the Court by taking away its interpretive
70. ADAAA Sec. 4, §§ 3(2)(A), (B).
71. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 197–98.
72. Id.
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function in its role in the judiciary.  The foundation of our government’s
success is dependent on a continual commitment to the principle of sepa-
ration of powers that creates checks and balances between the branches
of government.  In drafting the ADA, Congress must also have been
mindful of its broader legislative power to make the law rather than caus-
ing interference with the judicial branch’s primary duty to provide for the
law’s interpretation.
B. The Elimination of “Mitigating Measures”
Among the most pronounced changes to the ADA through the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 was the elimination of the use of “corrective
mitigating measures.”73  It is without doubt that Congress had serious dis-
agreement with the Court in this analysis because of the danger that the
use of any “corrective measures” would have on jeopardizing the protec-
tion of a vast number of people with disabilities.  Congress recognized
many individuals with disabilities who use accommodations and assistive
technologies to at least minimize the difficulties, and challenges posed by
living with a disability, or disabilities would potentially lose the protec-
tions afforded to them under the ADA if the Court’s current analysis
continued.  This is reflected by Congress’s decision to specifically elimi-
nate the consideration of any mitigating measures in determining whether
or not an individual has a disability.  The ADAAA not only eliminates
analysis of mitigating measures in rejection of Supreme Court precedent,
but also outlines what is specifically included in mitigating measures that
should not be examined.  The text reads as follows:
(E)(i) The determination of whether an impairment substantially
limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ame-
liorative effects of mitigating measures such as—
(I) medication, medical supplies, equipment, or appliances, low-
vision devices (which do not include ordinary eyeglasses or contact
lenses), prosthetics including limbs and devices, hearing aids and
cochlear implants or other implantable hearing devices, mobility
devices, or oxygen therapy equipment and supplies;
(II) use of assistive technology;
(III) reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids or services; or
(IV) learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications.74
Congress did, however, maintain consideration of “ordinary eye-
glasses” as mitigating measures.  The amendments provide the following
guidance for cases involving the use of assistance for vision:
73. ADAAA Sec. 4, § 3(4)(E).
74. Id.
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(ii) The ameliorative effects of the mitigating measures of ordinary
eyeglasses or contact lenses shall be considered in determining
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.
(iii) As used in this subparagraph—
(I) the term “ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses” means lenses
that are intended to fully correct visual acuity or eliminate refrac-
tive error; and
(II) the term “low-vision devices” means devices that magnify, en-
hance, or otherwise augment a visual image.75
These changes provided in the amendments certainly give significant
insight into whether or not Congress originally intended for individuals
using mitigating measures to be counted among those benefiting from the
ADA’s protections.
C. Dissent in Sutton Highlights Court’s Disregard for Legislative
History & Intent of ADA
Not every Justice agreed with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Sutton
that led to the inclusion of “corrective measures” in making disability
determinations under the ADA.  The dissent in Sutton reveals both the
disregard for legislative history and congressional intent for the original
ADA by the Court and demonstrates that this willingness to overlook
Congress’s goals in enacting this landmark legislation is truly at the heart
of the pervasiveness of the narrowing of the law.76  In the Sutton dissent,
Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer set out what has been absent in review
of this particular case, which surely can be transferred to other cases in-
terpreting the ADA—appropriate attention given by the justices to the
legislative history and congressional intent for the ADA as enacted.77
This is clear first from this dissent’s commentary on the number crunch-
ing done by Congress in the findings of the original ADA of how many
Americans with disabilities the Act protects.78  This served as a source of
argument in both Toyota and Sutton and led the Court to choose a nar-
rower rather than broader path for the interpretation of the ADA.  This
is expressed by Justice Stevens in the opening paragraph of the dissent:
Indeed, by reason of legislative myopia it may not have foreseen that
its definition of “disability” might theoretically encompass, not just
“some [43 million] Americans,” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1), but perhaps
two or three times that number.  Nevertheless, if we apply customary
75. ADAAA Sec. 4, §§ 3(4)(E)(ii) & (iii)(I)–(IV).
76. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 495-515 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
77. Id. at 495-96.
78. Id. at 495.
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tools of statutory construction, it is quite clear that the threshold
question whether an individual is “disabled” within the meaning of
the Act—and, therefore, is entitled to the basic assurances that the
Act affords—focuses on her past or present physical condition with-
out regard to mitigation that has resulted from rehabilitation, self-
improvement, prosthetic devices, or medication.  One might reasona-
bly argue that the general rule should not apply to an impairment
that merely requires a nearsighted person to wear glasses.  But I be-
lieve that, in order to be faithful to the remedial purpose of the Act,
we should give it a generous, rather than a miserly, construction.79
These words by Justice Stevens demonstrate his recognition that the
Court has not appropriately applied “customary tools of statutory con-
struction.”80  Justice Stevens’s dissent in interpreting the language of the
ADA commences with the notion that when cases involve statutory con-
struction, the Court is to first consider the purposes provided by Congress
for the legislation.81  Unlike the discussion in Toyota and Sutton, Justice
Stevens fleshes out the primary purpose of the ADA as directed expressly
by Congress that the “purpose of [the ADA is] to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.”82  Justice Stevens proceeds by ex-
plaining the extent of protection of the ADA in the employment con-
text.83  He uses an example of a man using a prosthetic leg to illustrate
the dangerousness of the utilization of the analysis put forth by the ma-
jority in order to emphasize that people who were legitimately intended
to be protected by the ADA would not receive such protections.84 Justice
Stevens wrote:
With the aid of prostheses, coupled with courageous determination
and physical therapy, many of these hardy individuals can perform
all of their major life activities just as efficiently as an average couch
potato.  If the Act were just concerned with their present ability to
participate in society, many of these individuals’ physical impair-
ments would not be viewed as disabilities.85
Again returning to the significance of congressional intent, Justice Ste-
vens engaged in a lengthy discussion of the role that legislative history
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 496 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 496–97 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)).
83. See id. at 497 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that ADA-covered employers are
banned from discriminating against disabled individuals because of their disability).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 497–98.
930 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 14:913
must play in statutory construction in the presence of silence by Con-
gress.  Justice Stevens expressed these sentiments as follows:
To the extent that there may be doubt concerning the meaning of the
statutory text, ambiguity is easily removed by looking at the legisla-
tive history.  As then-Justice Renhquist stated . . . “in surveying legis-
lative history we have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source
for finding the Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on
the bill, which ‘represen[t] the considered and collective understand-
ing of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying the pro-
posed legislation.’”  The Committee Reports on the bill that became
the ADA make it abundantly clear that Congress intended the ADA
to cover individuals who could perform all of their major life activi-
ties only with the help of ameliorative measures.86
Following Justice Rehnquist’s acknowledgement as confirmed by U.S.
Supreme Court precedent, Justice Stevens provided an in-depth analysis
of the Committee Reports in the enactment of the ADA leading him to
conclude that the extent to which individuals are to be protected under
the ADA includes those individuals using mitigating measures.87  Of par-
ticular interest, he referred to the Senate Committee Report as the ADA
originated in the Senate which states: “[W]hether a person has a disability
should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating mea-
sures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids.”88  Addition-
ally, the Report of the House of Representatives regarding the Judiciary
echoed the sentiments of the Senate Committee Report, “[t]he impair-
ment should be assessed without considering whether mitigating mea-
sures, such as auxiliary aids or reasonable accommodations, would result
in a less-than-substantial limitation.”89  Justice Stevens cited additional
reports that all reach the same conclusion—mitigating measures are not
to be considered in the determination of disability under the ADA.90
Beyond these reports, Justice Stevens highlighted the consistency of
regulations created to provide standards to interpreting the ADA as Con-
gress originally constructed it.  He wrote:
In addition, each of the three Executive agencies charged with imple-
menting the Act has consistently interpreted the Act as mandating
that the presence of disability turns on an individual’s uncorrected
state.  We have traditionally accorded respect to such views when, as
86. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 499 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 499-503.
88. Id. at 499–500 (quoting S.Rep. No. 101-116, p. 23 (1989)).
89. Id. at 500 (quoting S.Rep. No. 101-116, p. 23 (1989) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-
485, pt. III, p. 28 (1990)).
90. Id. at 501.
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here, the agencies “played a pivotal role in setting [the statutory]
machinery in motion.”91
Even in the event that the Court could not adopt the interpretations of
the regulations per se, Justice Stevens defended their use as legitimate
sources of reference for the Court’s statutory construction as evidenced
in previous case law.92
Finally, Justice Stevens attacked the argument made by the majorities
in both Toyota and Sutton that the 43 million number provided by the
findings of the original ADA impacts the extent to which the Court can
count individuals as disabled.93  Justice Stevens pointed to that statistic in
relation to the nature of the ADA’s commitment to ending discrimination
against people with disabilities as a remedial statute similar to other anti-
discrimination statutes:
I think it quite wrong for the Court to confine the coverage of the
Act simply because an interpretation of “disability” that adheres to
Congress’[s] method of defining the class it intended to benefit may
also provide protection for “significantly larger numbers” of individ-
uals, . . . than estimated in the Act’s findings.  It has long been a
“familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation
should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes.”  Congress
sought, in enacting the ADA, to “provide a . . . comprehensive na-
tional mandate for the discrimination against individuals with
disabilities.”94
What Congress intended through legislative history despite the absence
of similar language to this particular issue in the statutory text of the
ADA is so clear that it really questions how or why the Supreme Court
would have chosen to interpret the law to the contrary.  If Justice Ste-
vens’s arguments about statutory construction hold true, there are several
legitimate reasons why the Court has gotten it wrong in its interpretation
of the ADA resulting in congressional action to prevent any future nar-
rowing of the law by the Court.
91. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 501 (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555,
566 (1980)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 504–05.
94. Id. (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(b)(1)).
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D. Justice Scalia’s Commentary on “Textualism” & Statutory
Interpretation—Maybe the Supreme Court Got the Original
ADA Right?
One particular Justice currently sitting on the U.S. Supreme Court has
had a lot to say about the issue of statutory construction and interpreta-
tion.  Justice Antonin Scalia has not only written a book on it, but his
discourse on the methodology and its significance to Supreme Court ju-
risprudence has been a source of examination and reflection for those
writing on the work of the Supreme Court.  The preface to his book, A
Matter of Interpretation, concisely explains Justice Scalia’s view of statu-
tory interpretation: “A government of laws, not of men, means that the
unexpressed intent of legislators must not blind citizens.  Laws mean
what they actually say, not what legislators intended them to say but did
not write into the law’s text for anyone (and everyone so moved) to
read.”95  Justice Scalia’s favored methodology for statutory interpretation
has been termed “textualism” in which the jurist interprets the law based
on the words as provided in the statute’s text.  However, Justice Scalia is
careful to distinguish what his form of textualism embodies—as one not
so extreme to rise to the level of strict-construction textualism that pro-
hibits any reasonable interpretation that embraces the intent of the law.96
Justice Scalia wrote, “A text should not be construed strictly, and it
should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to
contain all that it fairly means.”97  Further, Justice Scalia explained that
he sees a textualist as a judge who maintains a moderate position by in-
terpreting neither too strictly nor too broadly, “[b]ut while the good tex-
tualist is not a literalist, neither is he a nihilist.  Words do have a limited
range of meaning, and no interpretation that goes beyond that range is
permissible.”98
In addition to his views on proper textualism, Justice Scalia has also
been critical of the use of both legislative intent and legislative history in
statutory interpretation.99  In discussing statutory construction, Justice
Scalia emphasized the irrelevancy and incompatibility of legislative intent
in cases in which both the text to a statute is clear and in cases where
ambiguity exists.100  Justice Scalia explains that when a statute is clear,
the words of the statute should prevail.101  Even in cases of ambiguity,
95. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 22 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997).
96. Id. at 23.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 24.
99. Id. at 16–17.
100. SCALIA, supra note 95, at 16–17.
101. Id. at 16.  Justice Scalia writes:
2012] ADA AMENDMENTS ACT 933
Justice Scalia argues that while it is a common assumption in legal
thought that legislative intent is the proper statutory construction tool to
provide meaning to the statute, this is another myth of the importance
and value of legislative intent.102
While Justice Scalia’s thoughts on legislative intent gives hints to his
acceptance of the use of legislative history, a later discussion in his book
on legislative history reveals his true feeling.  For Justice Scalia, legislative
history, like legislative intent, should not have the weight in statutory
construction that judges and lawyers tend to give it.  This is evidenced by
his statement: “My view that the objective indication of the words, rather
than the intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the law leads me, of
course, to the conclusion that legislative history should not be used as an
authoritative indication of a statute’s meaning.”103
Justice Scalia’s views on statutory interpretation have not only been the
focus of his personal writings, but have found their way into his Supreme
Court opinions offering further insight as to the interpretative issues in-
volving the ADA.  Recently, in his 2007 dissenting opinion in Zuni Public
School District No. 89 v. Department of Education,104 Justice Scalia ex-
pressed his disagreement with and criticism of several fellow justices in
sidestepping proper statutory interpretation based on the plain meaning
of the text as opposed to embracing “judge-supposed legislative intent”
You will find it frequently said in judicial opinions of my court and others that the
judge’s objective in interpreting a statute is to give effect to “the intent of the legisla-
ture.”  This principle, in one form or another, goes back at least as far as Blackstone.
Unfortunately, it does not square with some of the (few) generally accepted concrete
rules of statutory construction.  One is the rule that when the text of the statute is
clear, that is the end of the matter.  Why should that be so, if what the legislature
intended, rather than what it said, is the object of our inquiry?  In selecting the words
of the statute, the legislature might have misspoken.  Why not permit that to be
demonstrated from the floor debates?  Or indeed, why not accept, as proper for the
court to consider, later explanations by the legislators—a sworn affidavit signed by the
majority of each house, for example, as to what they really meant?
Id. (internal citations omitted).
102. Id. at 16–17.  In furthering his point Justice Scalia explains that:
Another accepted rule of construction is that ambiguities in a newly enacted statute
are to be resolved in such fashion as to make the statute, not only internally consis-
tent, but also compatible with previously enacted laws.  We simply assume, for pur-
poses of our search for “intent,” that the enacting legislature was aware of all those
other laws.  Well of course that is a fiction, and if we were really looking for the sub-
jective intent of the enacting legislature we would more likely find it by paying atten-
tion to the text (and legislative history) of the new statute in isolation.
Id.
103. Id. at 29–30.
104. 550 U.S. 81 (2007).
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to arrive at an interpretation.105  Justice Scalia finds this practice of ad-
vancing legislative intent over clear statutory language disturbing for its
appearance of judicial activism that allows justices to essentially create
the law by their determination of what Congress intended.106  His view is
also formulated on the historical basis of the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence.  The method of statutory construction based on legislative intent
over clear statutory language does not hold up in light of Court precedent
that has consistently held the starting place of interpretation to be at the
exact language contained in the statute.107  Justice Scalia’s dissent in Zuni
goes to the heart of his disagreement of adopting legislative intent over
clear statutory language:
The very structure of the Court’s opinion provides an obvious clue as
to what is afoot.  The opinion purports to place a premium on the
plain text of the Impact Aid statute . . . but it first takes us instead on
a roundabout tour of ‘[c]onsiderations other than language,’ . . . page
after page of unenacted congressional intent and judicially perceived
statutory purpose.108
In his dissent, Justice Scalia also made the argument that it is incorrect
to use legislative intent as an instrument for statutory construction when
the Court has not faithfully respected and followed its own jurisprudence
of first giving weight to the language of the statute.109  In Zuni, Scalia not
only admonished the majority for its willingness to ignore this established
practice but suggested that the real intent behind neglecting statutory lan-
guage is to provide the Court an opportunity to craft policy:
Nor is this cart–before–the–horse approach justified by the Court’s
excuse that the statute before us is, after all, a technical one . . . .
105. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 108 (2007) (Scalia, J. dissent-
ing).  In Zuni, the Court determined whether the federal Impact Aid Act permits the Sec-
retary of Education “to identify the school districts that should be ‘disregard[ed]’ by
looking at the number of the district’s pupils as well as to the size of the district’s expendi-
tures per pupil.” Id. at 84 (majority opinion).  The court looked to “the history and pur-
pose of the disregard instruction” in determining that the “Secretary’s calculation formula
is a reasonable method that carries out Congress’s likely intent in enacting the statutory
provision.” Id. at 93.  In his dissent, Justice Scalia expresses that “[t]he plain language of
the federal Impact Aid statute clearly and unambiguously forecloses the Secretary of Edu-
cation’s preferred methodology for determining whether a State’s school-funding system is
equalized.” Id. at 108 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See 20 U.S.C. § 7701 (discussing the federal
Impact Aid Act).
106. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. at 109-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. See id. at 109 (lamenting that the Court took a round-about way to come to the
conclusion that “the statute’s plain language does not unambiguously preclude the inter-
pretation the Court thinks best”).
108. Id. at 108.  “We must begin as we always do, with the text.” Id. at 109.
109. Id. at 109.
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This Court, charged with interpreting, among other things, the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, and the Clean Air Act, confronts technical language all the
time, but we never see fit to pronounce upon what we think Con-
gress meant a statute to say, and what we think sound policy would
counsel it to say, before considering what it does say.  As almost a
majority of today’s majority worries, “[w]ere the inversion [of in-
quiry] to become systemic, it would create the impression that
agency policy concerns, rather than the traditional tools of statutory
construction, are shaping the judicial interpretation of statutes.”
True enough—except I see no reason to wait for the distortion to
become systemic before concluding that that is precisely what is hap-
pening in the present case.  For some, policy-driven interpretation is
apparently just fine.  But for everyone else, let us return to Statutory
Interpretation 101.110
This passage by Justice Scalia is significant for another reason.  It high-
lights the categorization of “technical” areas of law, which disability
rights legislation would fall into due to its complexities.  Justice Scalia
would view the ADA no differently than the other “technical” statutes he
describes that also must follow the traditional mode of statutory interpre-
tation by attention first to the actual text of the statute.  Later in his opin-
ion, Justice Scalia also warns of the dangers of the use of legislative intent
by judges because it creates greater opportunities for misinterpretation
and guesswork since multiple entities become involved in the process.111
For Justice Scalia, judges surely cannot have the same level of certainty in
basing an interpretive decision on legislative intent as they can by refer-
ring to the textual support of the statute.  In his eyes he surely favors
erring on the side of basing opinions on what is likely to cause the least
indecisiveness and potential for error—the text Congress chose to ex-
press the protections it wanted that in and of itself should already em-
body the legislative intent.
Another interesting issue that comes up in Justice Scalia’s dissent that
relates to the Supreme Court’s examination of the ADA is the role that
statistics play in making interpretations of the law.112  Justice Scalia
wrote:
110. Id. (internal citations omitted).
111. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 116–17 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
112. See generally Joseph L. Gastworth, The U.S. Supreme Court Finds a Statute’s
Description of a Simple Statistical Measure of Relative Disparity ‘Ambiguous’ Allowing the
Secretary of Education to Interpret the Formula: Zuni Public School District 89 v. U.S.
Department of Education II, 7 LAW PROB. & RISK 225 (2008) (analyzing the interpretation
of statistics in the Zuni decision).
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To understand why, one first must look beyond the smokescreen that
the Court lays down with its repeated apologies for inexperience in
statistics, and its endless recitation of technical mathematical defini-
tions of the word “percentile.”  This case is not a scary math prob-
lem; it is a straightforward matter of statutory interpretation.  And
we do not need the Court’s hypothetical cadre of number-crunching
to guide our way.113
For Justice Scalia, this attention to understanding statistics is virtually
irrelevant because focus should be placed instead on the statutory text.
Again, he reiterated in his dissenting opinion that making an interpreta-
tion in the context of defining statistical data has no bearing on interpre-
tation when the statutory text provides the answer:
The sheer applesauce of this statutory interpretation should be obvi-
ous.  It is of course true that every student in New Mexico causes an
expenditure or produces a revenue that his LEA either enjoys (in the
case of revenues) or is responsible for (in the case of expenditures).
But it simply defies any semblance of normal English usage to say
that every pupil has a “per-pupil expenditure or revenue.”  The word
“per” connotes that the expenditure or revenue is a single average
figure assigned to a unit the composite members of which are individ-
ual pupils.  And the only such unit mentioned in the statute is the
local educational agency.  It is simply irrelevant that ‘[n]o dictionary
definition . . . suggests that there is any single logical, mathematical,
or statistical link between [per-pupil expenditures or revenues]
and . . . the nature of the relevant population.’  Of course there is
not.114
Considering the Court’s interpretations of the ADA, the Court’s exam-
ination of the number of individuals with disabilities that Congress stated
the ADA was designed to protect is meaningless according to Justice
Scalia’s analysis because the actual text of the ADA defines the extent of
inclusion under the statute by defining the term “disability.”  There is no
need for the Court to engage in a numbers game when words explicitly
provide meaning.
Based on the above, Justice Scalia would no doubt find any attempt by
the Court to inject its own meaning into a statute like the ADA through
legislative intent or history to be futile as the text itself can and should be
the primary source for interpretation.  For Scalia, whatever statutory text
Congress provided for terms like “disability” and “major life activity,”
113. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. at 111 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted).
114. Id. at 113 (internal citations omitted).
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the Court is to rely on the text as stated and should continue to do so
until and unless Congress amends the text to reflect a different intention.
From Scalia’s standpoint, it is not the duty of the Court to get involved in
authoring the meaning of the text itself by delving into the legislative
intent and history.
IV. THE POWER TO MAKE LAW V. THE POWER TO INTERPRET LAW:
WHAT WILL THE ADAAA MEAN FOR DISABILITY?
The debate over the proper interpretation of “disability” under the
ADA sheds light on the relationship between two federal institutions and
how their relationship can impact public policy.  While Congress is
charged with the responsibility of creating the law, the U.S. Supreme
Court is charged with the responsibility of interpreting the law.  This sep-
aration of power implements a system of checks-and-balances within the
U.S. government in the hope of preventing one branch from usurping
excessive authority.
Even though the Court has the power of judicial review, legislative his-
tory and congressional intent should still be considered when interpreting
the law.  Resources used by the Court, however, have often altered its
interpretation of the law, which also changes congressional intent and
how the law is ultimately applied.  As the Supreme Court continues to
engage in offering its own interpretation of the law, congressional intent
is ignored.  Logically, it is appropriate to assume that if Congress leaves
less room open for interpretation, courts will have less of an opportunity
to engage in interpretation contrary to legislative history and intent.  Yet,
disability law demonstrates that consistent legislative history and congres-
sional intent continues to offer the Court opportunity to insert its inter-
pretive authority.
Since the passage of the ADAAA in 2008, several notable develop-
ments have occurred regarding the ADAAA and the interpretation of
“disability.”  On March 25, 2011, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) released final regulations to accompany the
ADAAA that include the definition of “disability.”115  As stated in the
final regulation:
In enacting the ADA Amendments Act, Congress explicitly stated
its expectation that the EEOC would amend its ADA regulations to
115. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the ADA, as
Amended; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 16978, 16980 (Mar. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-03-25/pdf/2011-
6056.pdf.  “The term ‘actual disability’ is used as short-hand terminology to refer to an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity within the meaning of the first
prong of the definition of disability.” Id.
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reflect the changes made by the statute.  These changes necessarily
extend as well to the Interpretive Guidance (also known as the Ap-
pendix) that was published at the same time as the original ADA
regulations and that provides further explanation on how the regula-
tions should be interpreted.116
Additionally, the EEOC provided guidance117 on its final regulations for
the ADAAA including the interpretation of disability and a fact sheet.118
While case law interpreting the definition of “disability” since the pas-
sage of the ADAAA is not substantial at this point, it still provides valua-
ble insight as to the interpretative direction of the courts.
Simultaneously, it also raises a significant question regarding the expan-
sion of the amended definition, which was designed to reinstate the origi-
nal intent of the ADA.  In Hoffman v. Carefirst of Fort Wayne, Inc.,119
the Northern District of Indiana ruled that a worker’s renal cell carci-
noma was a disability under the ADAAA.120  The employee claimed that
his cancer should be considered a disability under the ADA because it
served as the basis for his termination.  The court’s decision states that:
Hoffman claims he is a qualified individual with a disability under
the ADA because his renal cell carcinoma (which was in remission at
the time of the alleged termination), constitutes a disability under
the recent ADA Amendments, and Advanced Healthcare unlawfully
terminated his employment when it failed to offer him a reasonable
accommodation.  Additionally, Hoffman alleges Advanced Health-
care unlawfully terminated his employment because it regarded him
as being disabled.121
In examining the question of disability, the court reviewed the history
of the ADA and the U.S. Supreme Court decisions leading to the passage
of the ADAAA.122  The court made the following observations regarding
116. Id.
117. Questions and Answers on the Final Rule Implementing the ADA Amendments
Act of 2008, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regula-
tions/ada_qa_final_rule.cfm (last visited Mar. 13, 2012).
118. Fact Sheet on the EEOC’s Final Regulations Implementing the ADAAA, U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/adaaa_fact_
sheet.cfm (last visited Mar. 13, 2012).
119. 737 F. Supp. 2d 976 (2010).
120. Hoffman v. Carefirst of Fort Wayne, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 2d 976, 977 (N.D. Ind.
2010).  In this case the court reasoned that the employee met the requirements to prove
prima a facie case. Id.
121. Id. at 978.
122. Id. at 984.  The court goes on to state that Congress expanded the scope of the
ADA to give individuals a broader scope of protection. Id.
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the definition of “disability” under the ADAAA with respect to the con-
sideration of renal cancer in remission:
Although the ADAAA left the ADA’s three-category definition of
“disability” intact, significant changes were made to how the catego-
ries are to be interpreted.  Importantly, the ADAAA clarified that
the operation of “major bodily functions,” including “functions of
the immune system,” constitute major life activities under the ADA’s
first definition of disability.  Moreover, the ADAAA very clearly
provides that “an impairment that is episodic or [in remission] is a
disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when
active.”123
Because the employee’s cancer was in remission and not impacting a ma-
jor life activity allowing the employee to return to work, this case of can-
cer in remission did not constitute a disability under the ADA.124
Additionally, the employer argued that the ADA was not meant to pro-
vide such a broad umbrella of protection, despite lacking proof through
legislative history to substantiate his argument.125
To assess whether or not cancer in remission constituted a disability,
the court realized that this case was one of first impression under the
ADAAA.  Even though the court attempted to find case law considering
“individuals with cancer in remission” as “disabled,” they were unable to
do so.  This was due to the fact that the ADAAA amendments had been
held to be retroactive at the time of the suit, so there was little case law,
and Hoffman’s case was one of the first “to make it to the summary judg-
ment phase.”126
The court noted that it must not spend an exhaustive amount of time in
determining “disability” as directed by the language of the ADAAA.127
Further, the court looked to the direct language of the ADAAA in the
coverage it provides to those with conditions in remission.  They ex-
amined his disability status based on language from the ADAAA that
identifies cancer in remission as a disability “if it would substantially limit
a major life activity.”128  Because cancer would have impacted a major
life activity, an individual is not required to show the impact on a major
life activity with regard to remission as it is essentially tied to cancer.129
123. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D)) (internal citations removed).
124. Id. at 985.
125. Hoffman, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 985.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 984.
128. Id. at 985.
129. Id.
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Therefore, the court ruled that the employee’s renal cancer in remission
was protected under the ADA as amended by the ADAAA.130
Using similar analysis, the Northern District of Illinois determined that
HIV constituted a “disability” under the ADAAA.131  In Horgan v. Sim-
mons,132 the court examined a challenge by an employee who claimed to
have been terminated after his employer learned of his HIV status.133
Just like the Indiana federal district court, the Illinois court began with
the history of the changes to the ADA regarding the definition of “disa-
bility” through the passage of the ADAAA.134  In reaching the decision
that HIV status is a disability under the ADA as amended by the
ADAAA, the court viewed his status as limiting the major life activity of
having a functional immune system.135  The court believed the EEOC’s
proposed regulations were consistent with their decision since it lists HIV
“as an impairment that will consistently meet the definition of
disability.”136
The employer in this case relied on a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
case137 where it had been determined that an employee failed to provide
evidence to support a claim that HIV status qualified as a disability under
the ADA.138  The Simmons court noted that in EEOC v. Lee’s Log
Cabin, Inc.,139 the Seventh Circuit distinguished AIDS from HIV status,
and the employee had not demonstrated that major life activities were
impacted by HIV.140  The court further concluded that the Seventh Cir-
cuit had not recognized HIV status as a disability, and several other
courts have ruled that an individual’s HIV-positive status constituted a
per se disability pursuant to the ADA.141
Additionally, it is also important to note that the EEOC will poten-
tially play a significant role in shaping the interpretation of “disability”
under the ADAAA with the cases it seeks to bring into the legal sys-
130. Hoffman v. Carefirst of Fort Wayne, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 2d 976, 985 (N.D. Ind.
2010).
131. Horgan v. Simmons, 704 F. Supp. 2d 814 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
132. 704 F. Supp. 2d 814, 819 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
133. Horgan, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 816.
134. Id. at 818.
135. Id. at 819.
136. Id.
137. See EEOC v. Lee’s Log Cabin, Inc., 546 F.3d 438 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[C]laiming
that employer violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by refusing to hire
applicant because she was human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) positive.”).
138. Horgan, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 819.
139. 546 F.3d 438 (7th Cir. 2008).
140. Horgan, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 819 n.2.
141. Id. at 819 n.3.
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tem.142  The EEOC has brought claims that will force courts to wrestle
with making decisions on whether certain conditions qualify as a “disabil-
ity” under the ADAAA including chronic arthritis pain,143 diabetes, hy-
pertension,144 and cancer.145  But perhaps what may become the most
controversial attempt at deeming an impairment a disability is the prob-
lem of obesity.146  The following reflection suggests that obesity may be-
come one of the newest disabilities under the ADAAA:
Obviously, the recent slate of cases brought by the EEOC indicates
the agency’s desire to pinpoint where courts will draw the line on
what is considered a “disability.”  For example, in EEOC v. Re-
sources for Human Development, the EEOC alleges that an em-
ployer unlawfully terminated an employee who had a disability,
specifically obesity.  Will a court consider obesity a “disability” under
the new standard?  A cursory comparison of her condition to the
new “disability” standard reveals that she might have a
“disability.”147
Legal scholars are already suggesting the ease with which a claim for
obesity under the ADAAA may occur compared to the original ADA.148
142. Alex H. Glaser, The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act: Legal Im-
plications and the Effect on Employer-Employee Relationships, 59 LA. B. J. 94, 95–96
(2011).
143. See id. at 96 (commenting on a recent case where the EEOC will have to decide
whether arthritis is a disability) (citing EEOC v. Eckerd Corp., No. 10-2816 (N.D. Ga.
2000)).
144. Complaint at 17, EEOC v. Fisher, No. 10-cv-02453-BEL (D. Md. Sept. 7, 2010),
2010 WL 3532168.
145. See Glaser, supra note 142, at 96 (commenting on a recent case brought by the
EEOC on behalf of an employee diagnosed with cancer) (citing EEOC v. IPC Print Servs.,
No. 10-886 (W.D. Mich. 2010)).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. Attorney Alex H. Glaser writes:
To prove that she has a “disability,” the employee must prove that she (1) has an
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, (2) has a record
of such impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment.  Arguably, the
employee’s obesity is a physical impairment that limits a major life activity.  Take, for
instance, the life activities of “standing,” “bending” and “breathing,” all listed in the
ADAAA’s definition of “major life activities.  Her obesity also may constitute a “re-
cord of impairment.”  If the employee had a history of obesity at work, she might have
a disability under this prong of the definition.  Moreover, she may be “regarded as”
having an impairment.  Under this definition of “disability,” she would only need to
show that the employer took an adverse employment action based upon her obesity,
regardless of the employer’s perception of her physical limitations.  Accordingly, the
plaintiff in this case might be able to prove that obesity is a “disability.”  This com-
plaint shows just how expansive the definition of “disability” is under the ADAAA.
Id.
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While it has been known that obesity has been previously covered by the
original ADA, this has only occurred in certain situations and the new
ADAAA has been said to create an opportunity for obesity to become a
per se disability:
Is obesity considered a disability?  According to the CDC, cases of
obesity continue to rise in the United States. Nevertheless, the courts
and the EEOC have long maintained that simple obesity is not a
recognized impairment under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) unless the obesity was the result of physiological impair-
ments. However, recent amendments to the ADA may cause obesity
to be reclassified as a disability.149
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) report that
“[a]bout one-third of U.S. adults (33.8%) are obese.”150  The CDC has
also kept track of the prevalence of obesity in adults.151  It is also known
that individuals who are obese will incur greater health care costs.152  “In
2008, medical costs associated with obesity were estimated at $147 billion;
the medical costs paid by third-party payors for people who are obese
were $1,429 higher than those of normal weight.”153 Because of this prob-
lem, if obesity is covered as a disability under the ADAAA, employers
may inevitably be required to shell out greater costs in health care.  Un-
less American citizens reverse course dramatically, half the U.S. popula-
tion is expected to be obese by the year 2030.154
149. Jennifer Pearson Taylor & Ian P. Hennessey, Legal Matters: Obesity Definition
Set to Expand under the ADA, E. TENN. MED. NEWS, http://easttnmedicalnews.com/
news.php?viewStory=1640 (last visited Mar. 13, 2012).
150. Data & Statistics: Adult Obesity, CNTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html (last updated Feb. 27, 2012).
151. Id.  The CDC states that:
No state has met the nation’s Healthy People 2010 goal to lower obesity prevalence to
15%.  The number of states with an obesity prevalence of 30% or more has increased
to [twelve] states in 2010.  In 2009, nine states had obesity rates of 30% or more.  In
2000, no state had an obesity prevalence of 30% or more.
Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Talea Miller, Obesity Rates Rising Worldwide, Half of U.S. Could Be Obese by
2030, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2011/08/
obesity-rates-rising-worldwide-us-could-hit-50-by-2030.html.  “In the United States, where
health officials have termed obesity an epidemic, more than [fifty] percent of the adult
population could be obese by 2030 if current trends continue, a team from Columbia Uni-
versity and Harvard University wrote . . . .” Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The latest clash between the Supreme Court and Congress over inter-
pretation of the original ADA brings up many questions about Con-
gress’s ability to create the law and choose between conflicting purposes
and interests that bleed into the judiciary’s role of the U.S. Supreme
Court.  While public policy is believed to lie primarily in the hands of
Congress, this concept is weakened when the Supreme Court is called
upon to provide statutory construction that creates rather than interprets
the law.  This can be dangerous in areas of public policy like disability law
where the rights of individuals may be jeopardized at the hands of the
judiciary. Incorporating two fundamental safeguards, however, would
bolster future public policy positions.  Congress should take greater care
in identifying the protections it intends to provide, and the U.S. Supreme
Court should be more cautious in considering legislative history and con-
gressional intent in providing statutory construction.
Exactly how broadly courts will interpret the definition of “disability”
is still unknown; however, if the current judicial trends continue, the “dis-
ability” envisioned originally by the ADA may in fact become even
broader than originally intended.  If courts go so far as to accept obesity
generally as a disability, there is no doubt that disability under the
ADAAA will become far larger as the number of obese Americans con-
tinues to expand significantly.  If everyone potentially classified as obese
is then labeled as disabled, is the new ADAAA still workable?  Or will it
set the stage for another battle between Congress and the U.S. Supreme
Court over “disability”?  The interpretation of “disability” under the
ADAAA will perhaps be the next great chapter in both disability law and
the inherent tension in our system of checks and balances.  However, the
potential expansion of “disability” under the ADAAA to include all
those considered obese, while not necessarily practical, may suggest
something larger—that maybe all of us are “disabled” to some extent.
The greatest barrier to achieving an end to discrimination against people
with disabilities has been attitudinal.  If the discussion of obesity as a dis-
ability turns heads and raises questions, then maybe it does so to the ben-
efit of those whom disability law was intended to protect—those with
disabilities severe enough to warrant protection, and therefore, accom-
modation, coming as close to equality as possible.
Expanding the ADAAA to include obesity across the board as a disa-
bility may not be sound policy as its implications could be substantial, but
the dialogue it may create for disability law could have a lasting impact
on recognizing that people with disabilities seek the protections the law
creates not as a means of being treated differently or getting a benefit,
but because they are human beings who deserve the same opportunities
as those without disabilities.  The law must make such distinctions of who
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is and who is not disabled because the attitudinal barrier has been perva-
sive and prevented people with disabilities from having opportunities
without the existence of legal protections to ensure those opportunities.
In a dream world, defining “disability” would not be necessary because
our society would naturally take necessary measures to ensure equal op-
portunity.  In reality, another major U.S. Supreme Court case may be
required to decide the fate of obesity as a disability under the ADAAA.
